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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
problem de noVo. The doctrine of stare decisis does not require that the
court worship ex post facto rationalization.
If it is the settled rule that underlying facts of past conditions determine
the constitutionality of legislation 27 then the Adkins case should not have
been considered as binding precedent in any regard.28 The march of events
dictates the desirability of minimum wage legislation.
There is nothing explicit in the Constitution which denies to the states
the right to protect women from the exploitation of employers: the concept
of due process is purely "judge-made". 29 Admitting that the support of
women employees who do not earn subsistence cannot be transferred to em-
ployers who pay the reasonable value of the service obtained, the Act inval-
idated in the principal case does not seem an unreasonable measure on the
part of a government which is compelled to deal with problems of poverty,
subsistence, and morals. W. F. '37.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - GuFFEY ACT. - Once
again the Supreme Court has declared that national economic needs cannot
be attained through legislative enactments which exceed constitutional limi-
tations. In the most recent decision' the Court has declared invalid the
Guffey Act 2 which was a statutory plan to regulate the Bituminous Coal
Industry throughout the country. Inter alia the act provided for the regu-
lation of working conditions of the miners and for protection to collective
bargaining. The majority of the court rejected the theory that interstate
commerce is "directly" affected by strike and lockouts resulting in curtail-
ment of production or by resultant changes in the sale price. It was held
on the contrary that the evil incidents of strikes, etc., are local in their
nature and that their effect upon commerce is merely secondary and in-
direct. The dissenting opinion upholds more particularly the "price-fixing"
provision of the Act, which were invalidated in the eyes of the majority by
their connection with labor control, but intimates that the labor provisions
might be sustained through similar reasoning.
The Court has been fairly consistent in holding that production is not
commerce but merely a step in the preparation for commerce. The possi-
bility or certainty of the exportation of articles into another state does not
impart to their production the character of interstate commerce.4 Hence
27 O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1931) 282 U. S. 251;
Abie State Bank v. Bryan (1931) 282 U. S. 765, 776.
28 The Permanence of Constitutionality (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 1101.
29 Thomas Reed Powell, Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation (1924)
37 Harv. L. Rev. 545. This article also points out that minimum wage laws
would probably had been sustained had the issue been presented to the
court at some other time.
1 Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (May 18, 1936) 56 S. Ct. 855.
2 (1935) 49 Stat. 991.
3 Chassaniol v. Greenwood (1934) 291 U. S. 584, 587; U. S. v. E. C.
Knight Co. (1895) 156 U. S. 1; Kidd v. Pearson (1888) 128 U. S. 1.
4 Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 245, 259; Coe v. Errol
(1886) 116 U. S. 517.
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industries such as manufacturing,5 refining,6 and mining7 are considered
local businesses and therefore not subject to federal regulatory measures en-
acted under the authority of the Commerce Clause.8 This distinction be-
tween interestate and intrastate commerce is predicated upon the supposed
necessity of preserving the autonomy of the states as required by our dual
system of sovereignty.9
The court has, however, sustained the power of Congress to regulate
transactions so interwined with interstate commerce as to become an inte-
gral part of the "flow" of such commerce.'0 So too the "commerce clause"
has been construed to permit federal regulation of intrastate commerce
which adversely affects interstate commerce" and those transactions which
are aimed at curtailing such commerce.' 2 The standard question has come
to be, Does the local activity affect interstate commerce "directly" or "in-
directly"?13 While the court has said that the distinction between "direct"
and "indirect" is clear in principle,14 a survey of the cases shows that it has
been interpreted with suppleness of adaptation and flexibility of meaning' 5
so that, despite the warning of some of the justices,' 6 it has ben often em-
ployed as a "device"' 7 to reach the conclusion desired.
The employment of men, fixing of wages, etc., are admittedly intercourse
for the purposes of production and not of trade; but the wages of coal
miners in one state affect the wages of miners elsewhere, since the coal
which they produce compete in the "interstate market." Any state which
would undertake to raise the miners' wages would ruin its domestic coal
business. In holding that the regulation of wages and hours of employes
engaged in producing comomdities for the "interstate market" is beyond
the power of the Federal Government the court is simply saying that there
may be no effective regulation of them at all. Should the court desire to
sustain such legislation it might justifiably find precedent in the labor
5 Kidd v. Pearson (1888) 128 U. S. 1.
6 U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co. (1895) 156 U. S. 1 (sugar refining); Champ-
lain Rfg. Co. v. Commission (1932) 286 U. S. 210 (oil refining).
I Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord (1923) 262 U. S. 172, 178.
s U. S. Const. Art. 1, see. 8.
9U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co. (1895) 156 U. S. 1; Hammer v. Dagenhart
(1918) 247 U. S. 251. There is some reason to feel that even under a
broader concept of "commerce" there is not a great danger of the complete
nationalization of industry. Stern, That Commerce Which Affects More
States than One (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1363.
10 Swift & Co. v. U. S. (1905) 196 U. S. 375; Stafford v. Wallace (1922)
258 U. S. 495; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. U. S. (1930) 280 U. S. 420;
Board of Trade v. Olsen (1923) 262 U. S. 1.
11 Southern Ry. Co. v. U. S. (1911) 222 U. S. 20.
12 Local 167, etc. v. U. S. (1934) 291 U. S. 293.
13 Shreveport Case (1914) 234 U. S. 342; R. R. Commission of Wiscon-
sin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. (1922) 257 U. S. 563.
,4 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S. (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 546.
15 Cardozo, J., dissenting in the principal case.
16 Stone J., dissenting in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania (1927) 273 U. S. 34,44.
17 Corwin, The Schechter Case--Landmark, or What? (1936) 13 N. Y.
L. Q. Rev. 151, 171.
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injunction cases. At the outset the court was prone to consider strikes as
purely local matters affecting interstate commerce only remotely,18 while
holding that secondary boycotts substantially affected interstate trade.19
Apparently realizing that boycotts could have no greater effect upon ship-
ments from factories than strikes which dosed the plants altogether, the
Court departed from its original holdings and in a case where the evidence
clearly showed that the purpose of the strike was to restrain interstate
trade, the federal power was held applicable.20 If, as the Court has said,
local incidents (railroad rates) lead to secondary consequences affecting
interstate commerce,21 then there seems to be a like immediacy here in
regard to miners' wages.
Particular issue must be taken with the Court's statement that whether
a commodity has come to rest after its interstate transportation (as in the
Schechter case) or whether the commodity has not yet entered the channels
of interstate commerce (as in the instant case) is a difference without sig-
nificance. This is a misstatement of fact which will probably bind the
Court for some years to come. In fact, where the establishment is one
whose product enters interstate commerce and competes elsewhere with
local products, the cost at which the product can be sold is the important
factor in the survival of producers and in the direction of the "flow" of
commerce. The need of a uniform level of competition furnishes the justi-
fication for Federal control. This same need is not necessarily present in
regard to establishments which handle a product after it has left the pro-
ducer's hands. 2 2
It is to be regretted that the Court refused to apply its language of an
earlier case23 and that the Court has no hesitancy to construe the Com-
merce Clause restrictively at the very time the Federal power Is most
needed to cope with the naitonal problems. 24 Circumstances now make it nec-
essary that we no longer regard interstate commerce as simple journies
across state boundaries. We must conceive of it as a stream of business
feeding and entering an "interstate market" which knows no state lines.
With this mental picture formed, regulatory measures by Congress will not
be open to the charge of an ulterior motive to usurp the powers of the
states, because then Congress will be dealing with the very subject-matter
1sUnited Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 344;
United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co. (1934) 265 U. S.
457.
19 Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274; Duplex Printing Press v. Deer-
ing (1921) 254 U. S. 443; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutter's Ass'n (1927) 274 U. S. 37.
20 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (1925) 268 U. S. 295.
This case is popularly known as the "Second Coronado Case."
21 Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Florida (1935) 295 U. S. 301, 306.22 Fuchs, A Postscript-The Schechter Case (1935) 20 ST. LOUIS L.
REV. 297, 299-300.
23 Swift & Co. v. U. S. (1905) 196 U. S. 375, 398: "Commerce among
the states is not a technical legal conception but a practical one, drawn from
the course of business."24 Supra, note 22, at p. 303.
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entrusted to it-or at least the local incidents thereof.2 5 Until then the Con-
stitution will not only still stand, but also it will stand sti.2
W. F. '37.
Editor's Note: The instant case was relied on by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in declaring invalid the National Labor Relations Board Act
(29 U. S. C. A. sec. 151) insofar as the Act authorized the Board to inter-
fere with the relationships of employers and employees in steel mills, etc.,
which the court regarded as a "local" business. National Labor Relations-
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. (C. C. A. 5, June 15, 1936) 3 U. S.
Law Week. 1084.
Ds rrI-AuToMoBiIn-SPoE0rMsER.--In the case of Jones v. West
Side Buick Auto Co.,% which was decided by the St. Louis, Missouri, Court
of Appeals, the plaintiff alleged that he purchased a used automobile from
the defendant. The defendant company had reconditioned the car for re-
sale by making certain improvements and repairs which added to the car's
appearance and value. The defendant charged a total of $84.52 against
his records for this reconditioning. Following this reconditioning, the de-
fendant had the speedometer set back over 26,000 miles. The plaintiff looked
at the car before he bought it and noticed the speedometer reading. Not
until after the plaintiff bought the car did he discover the discrepancy be-
tween the speedometer reading and the true mileage.
The defendant maintained "that the mere turning back of the speed-
ometer could not have constituted a representation .... " 2 Held, that a repre-
sentation as to the mileage of a car is a representation as to a material
fact and is just as effective a representation, when made by turning back
the speedometer, as it would be if made by word of mouth or written
guaranty.
This case does not present any innovation in the law.3 The only novelty
presented by this case is that the court held a speedometer reading to be a
representation.
Only in Mississippi and Washington have similar cases arisen in the
appellate courts. The leading Mississippi case is that of Nash Mississippi
Valley Motor Co. v. Childress4 in which case the plaintiff alleged that the
25 Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce-A Crucial Constitu-
tional Issue (1933) 18 Cornell L. Q. 477, 503.
26 Supra, note 17.
1 (May 5, 1936) 93 S. W. (2d) 1083.
2In this case the defendant also tried to defend his action by maintain-
ing that setting back speedometers was a trade custom. The court refused
to recognize the defense in the absence of proof of plaintiff's actual knowl-
edge of the custom or that the custom was so well known as to impute
knowledge of it to him. This point is well settled in Missouri: Brown v.
Strimple (1886) 21 Mo. App. 338; Hyde v. St. Louis Book & News Co.
(1888) 32 Mo. App. 298; Fellows v. Dorsey (1913) 171 Mo. App. 289, 157
S. W. 995; International Shoe Co. v. Lipschitz (1934) 72 S. W. (2d) 122.3 Harper On Torts, sec. 216 et seq.
4 (1930) 156 Miss. 157, 125 So. 708; Lizana v. Edward Motor Sales Co.
(1932) 163 Miss. 266, 141 So. 295.
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